Initial Coin Offerings: The Role of Subjective Information in Whitepapers by Zhang, Jiahang
Oberlin 
Digital Commons at Oberlin 
Honors Papers Student Work 
2019 




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Repository Citation 
Zhang, Jiahang, "Initial Coin Offerings: The Role of Subjective Information in Whitepapers" (2019). Honors 
Papers. 141. 
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/141 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For 
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu. 
Initial Coin Offerings: The Role of Subjective Information in Whitepapers 
Jiahang Zhang* 
Oberlin College 
Economics Honors Thesis 2018-2019 
Abstract 
Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are an unregulated form of financing that raises funds by 
issuing crypto tokens using blockchain technology. In this paper, I explore the relationship 
between the level of mispricing at ICOs and the subjectivity in whitepapers, which are documents 
released before ICOs that provide details on the features of the tokens. The subjective information 
is examined by indices of confidence, tone, and readability. The model in this paper analyzes a 
sample of 258 ICOs that ended during January to October 2018. I find that the confidence score 
of a whitepaper is negatively associated with the daily excess return of a token, and thus there is 
an inverse relationship between the confident whitepapers and the level of underpricing. Further 
analysis indicates that this relationship is more pronounced in countries with no crypto anti-money 
laundering laws. This study provides insights into the role of whitepapers in the emerging ICO 
markets. 
 

















Initial coin offerings (ICOs) have become a popular topic both in the industry and in 
academia in recent years. Many researchers have investigated the motivations behind ICOs and 
their economic consequences of the ICOs. For instance, Amsden and Schweizer (2018), Adhami 
et al. (2018), and Bourveau et al. (2018) explore the determinants of ICO success, which is 
commonly measured by whether a token is subsequently listed on an exchange and traded actively 
subsequent to its ICO. These studies find that the success of an ICO is associated with the presence 
of pre-ICO marketing events, uncertainty around the financial viability, and information disclosure 
on social media platforms. However, one of neglected factors is whether the subjective information 
in whitepapers, which are designed to provide information on ICOs to potential investors, has any 
role in ICO pricing. This study addresses the research gap by examining the relationship between 
the information content in the whitepapers and first-day ICO returns.  
Whitepapers1 have ample amounts of subjective information concerning future business 
plans and the potential business problems that may arise. In addition to the technical and financing 
details in the whitepapers, the subjective characteristics, such as the level of confidence and the 
readability of the whitepapers, could influence how investors assess the value of the tokens. In an 
ICO, the issuer sets an offering price and the reports offering amount based on its fundraising 
target and feedback received from the potential investors during their ICO roadshows. The first-
day ICO return, defined as the return of the crypto token from the initial offering to the end of its 
first trading day, measures the level of mispricing of the ICOs.  
Previous studies (Wales and Mousa, 2016; Loughran and McDonald, 2013, Li 2008) have 
shown that in the equity markets, subjective information, namely the emotional tone and 
                                               





readability, in files disclosing a corporate information, affects the first-day IPO returns of the 
company and their future earnings respectively. The goal of this paper is to test these existing 
theories about IPO underpricing and subjective information in company files in the crypto token 
markets. Since these two markets have different attributes2, the market’s response to changes in 
the subjective information in crypto markets could be inconsistent with evidence from the equity 
markets.  
The empirical results show that the relationship between whitepaper confidence and the 
excess return of a token’s ICO is significantly negative. Tokens with more confident whitepapers 
tend to be less underpriced or more overpriced at their ICO. To further explore the effect of crypto 
anti-money laundering laws, I divide the sample into two subgroups based on whether the token 
is issued in a country or region where anti-money laundering laws are enforced. The regression 
results from subsamples show that the negative relationship is primarily driven by tokens from 
countries where anti-money laundering laws on crypto tokens are not implemented. 
This paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature on ICOs by applying the 
subjective content analysis methods used in research papers on the equity markets to the crypto 
token markets. So far, the effect of subjective information in whitepapers on token ICO returns is 
still unexplored. The findings of this paper provide token investors with insights into the effect of 
whitepapers on investment decisions. 
 
2.Background 
Since Satoshi Nakamoto created the bitcoin in 2008, the cryptocurrency markets have been 
growing exponentially in the past ten years, reaching a total market capitalization of $121 billion 
                                               





USD in January 2019. Developments in blockchain technology have led to a new form of financing 
known as ICOs, whereby issuers of crypto tokens, usually blockchain ventures, obtain funding 
from the investors in exchange for crypto tokens that can be used to pay for the issuers’ future 
products or services. Whitepapers are documents published by the issuers of crypto tokens that 
introduce the new tokens to potential investors. This paper aims at exploring the relationship 
between the return of ICOs and the subjectivity contained in the whitepapers. 
Cryptocurrencies are decentralized digital assets that utilize cryptography and blockchain 
technology. There are three distinct types of cryptocurrency in the market: currency coins, security 
tokens, and utility tokens (SharesChain, Wilmoth). They are broadly divided into two subgroups 
based on whether they can operate independently with their own platform (such as Ethereum and 
Litecoin) as in the case of currency coins, or depend on the platform of other cryptocurrencies, as 
in the case of security and utility tokens.  
Currency coins mostly run on their own platforms and are designed as a medium of 
exchange, such as Bitcoin. Security tokens derive their value from external, tradable assets and 
constitute investment contracts. Holders of security tokens are not entitled to partial ownership of 
the issuing firm. Instead, they anticipate a future profit in the form of dividends, revenue share or 
price appreciation. One such example is tZERO, as the token holders are entitled to quarterly 
dividends derived from the profits of the tZERO platform. Lastly, utility tokens are issued by 
blockchain entrepreneurs to grant investors the right to access services that the issuer will provide 
in the future. They differ from equity in that they only confer consumptive power. Utility tokens 
also typically do not carry rights to the future cash flows of the issuer, except to the degree the 
token’s value is intrinsically tied to the network’s value. (Howell et al., 2018) This paper focuses 





Between January 2017 and April 2018, more than 1000 startups raised a total of about $12 
billion USD in their ICOs (Benedetti and Kostovetsky 2018). Raising funds through ICOs 
combines financing with building a customer base and reduces transaction costs due to the ease of 
creating crypto tokens using blockchain technology. An analog to the ICOs is the initial public 
offerings (IPOs) of equity securities. The key differences between ICOs and IPOs are that ICOs 
are unregulated, and the issuers set the price of the tokens, instead of hiring an underwriter to 
determine the value and attract buyers. In addition, the tokens do not guarantee the investors any 
voting rights in the issuing firm. Table 1 summarizes the differences between IPOs and ICOs. 
 
Table 1: Differences between IPOs and ICOs 
    ICO IPO 
Announcement Announces a summary of the ICO plan  Hires an investment bank as  
    to the cryptocurrency community  the underwriter for the IPO 
    to solicit interest and feedback      
Documentation Whitepaper Filings with the security regulator: 
    Initial Code Registration statement   
    Website Prospectus     
Marketing Public Relations Campaign: Roadshow:    
    Crypto forums and social networks Meeting with potential investors 
    Twitter, Reddit, Medium, GitHub, etc. Bookbuilding   
        Offer price set   
Sale Subscribers send cryptocurrencies Shares are allocated to investors. 
    and/or fiat currencies to a digital     
    address.        
Listing Tokens are listed on cryptocurrency Shares are listed on stock exchanges. 














Figure 1: Illustration of ICO timeline 
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An ICO typically begins with the publication of a whitepaper. ICO whitepapers are similar 
in spirit to IPO prospectuses. They are documents that outline the technological details of new 
crypto tokens, benefits of token ownership, and the business plan of the issuer. In the absence of 
government regulation, whitepapers are the primary sources of information for potential investors, 
since the issuers have no obligation to disclose any information about themselves.  
ICOs and cryptocurrency exchange platforms have been operating without any regulatory 
restrictions since the beginning of 2013. The U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
issued warnings suggesting that many ICOs had violated U.S. securities laws in July 2018. In 
February 2018, the SEC started to request information from blockchain ventures involved in ICO 
activities and issued orders to suspend several fraudulent ICOs, including Centra’s ICO3. By May 
2018, the U.S. and Canada had already carried out over 70 investigations to crack down ICO scams.  
Countries such as China and South Korea have taken a stringent stance toward crypto 
tokens. China banned all ICOs and closed cryptocurrency exchanges that were operating in 
mainland China in September 2017, while South Korea outlawed anonymous cryptocurrency 
trading in January 2018. Additionally, the European Union (EU) approved a regulation in April 
                                               
3 The co-founders of Centra Tech. Inc. claimed before the ICO that they would use the funds raised in the ICO to 
develop debit cards backed by Visa and MasterCard that allow investors to convert tokens to fiat money. But the 






2018 that requires cryptocurrency exchanges to register with the government of the country in 
which the exchanges are located. The EU also requires exchanges to undergo the “Know Your 
Customer” process, which verifies the identity and suitability of clients. 
 
3.Relevant Literature 
Three academic papers on IPOs have found that investors take rhetoric choices of an 
issuing firm as meaningful signals when considering the value of the firm. Wales and Mousa (2016) 
find a significant relationship between more emotionally charged language in prospectuses and 
first-day trading period returns. They use Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), a language 
processing program to quantify the emotional content discourse in prospectuses. The empirical 
results from this study indicate that expressing more emotional content in prospectuses 
significantly increase the first-day return of IPOs. On that basis, Wales and Mousa (2016) argue 
that emotional emphasis in prospectuses is interpreted as uncertainty of future earnings, and thus 
would lead to lower valuations of IPOs. Loughran and McDonald (2013) use the emotional tone 
of a firm’s S-1 filings4 as a proxy for ex-ante IPO uncertainty and build a model that explains the 
level of underpricing using the tone of the S-1. The authors take the frequency of weak modal 
words (may, could, depend, etc.) and words associated with positive/negative emotion (success, 
strong, loss, failure, adverse, etc.) as a measure for the emotional tone of an S-1 filing. The 
coefficients in the model demonstrate an association between the frequency of negative and 
uncertain words in S-1 filings and higher IPO first-day returns in the presence of other control 
variables. Li (2006) explores the effect of risk sentiment in corporate annual reports, measured by 
                                               
4 Form S-1 is the initial registration form for new securities required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for U.S.-based public companies. Any security that meets the criteria must have an S-1 filing 






the number of occurrences of risk related words (e.g. “risky”, “uncertainty”). The results reveal 
that reports with a large amount of risk sentiments experience significantly negative returns 
relative to those firms that express little risk sentiment in the twelve months after their annual 
report filing date. 
Studies considering the readability of company files illustrate the impact of readability on 
earnings and stock returns. Li (2008) computes a Fog index of readability and provides evidence 
that firm managers appear to strategically use annual report readability to obfuscate poor 
performance and decline in earnings. The Fog index is higher for unreadable documents. The study 
suggests firms with poor earnings quality tend to have a higher Fog score. Li (2008) also examines 
the relationship between annual report readability, measured by the Fog index, and stock returns. 
He finds that changes in the Fog index cannot predict future stock returns. In the case of IPOs, 
Rachappa and Kuntluru (2018) find that Fog index has a positive impact on the earning 
performance of IPO companies during the IPO year. This indicates that in the short run, prospectus 
readability is negatively related to earnings performance. 
A number of theoretical and empirical research papers on investor sentiments towards 
cryptocurrencies and ICOs as well.  Chod and Lyandres (2018) develop a theoretical framework 
to explain for the motivation behind adopting ICOs as a financing method. Their paper states that 
ICOs are preferred over other financing alternatives when there is a high risk of venture failure, 
since ICOs enable risk-averse startups to obtain a positive payoff by retaining part of the ICO 
proceeds even if the venture ultimately fails. 
Meanwhile, Lee et al. (2018) explore the phenomenon of the “wisdom of crowds” under 
ICO scenarios. They observe that the investors in the cryptocurrency markets tend to follow a 





a single expert. Their work shows that both ICO fundraising and secondary market performance 
are correlated with the analyst ratings, and sales in the early stage of an ICO. Therefore, the wisdom 
of the independent analysts who tend to be unbiased due to reputational concerns, and the wisdom 
of early token investors, can substitute the effect of underwriters as intermediaries in financing 
ventures in the FinTech era.  
Amsden and Schweizer (2018) show that venture uncertainty (lengthier whitepapers, and 
less information available on GitHub and Telegram) is negatively related to the success of ICOs. 
Howell et al. (2018) find that tokens with higher issuer transparency, proxied by variables such as 
the presence of a whitepaper, a code on GitHub, and Twitter activities, tend to achieve a higher 
level of liquidity, measured by dollar volume and turnover, after their listing. In addition, Bourveau 
et al. (2018) focus on the effect of the information environment on ICO success. Their study finds 
significant evidence that a better information environment (active social media accounts) is 
positively correlated with ICO success. Additionally, their study demonstrates that the crash risk 
of a crypto token, measured by the presence of extreme negative returns, tends to be higher if the 
length of the token’s whitepaper is short and readability of the whitepaper is low.  
In summary, papers regarding the IPOs have shown an association between equity returns 
and subjective information in the firm’s files that are publicly available. Studies on ICOs have 
provided theoretical frameworks explaining the ICOs as well. Additionally, empirical research 
papers exploring the determinants of ICO success illustrate that ICO success is associated with 
factors such as the amount of information available and the readability of whitepapers. Meanwhile, 







The literature on IPO underpricing suggests that investment banks have incentives to 
ensure that new issues are slightly underpriced so that their clients’ securities are will look 
attractive when first traded. They are also mindful of excessive underpricing because the loss of 
funds of their clients would create the risk of a loss in their underwriting market share (Beatty and 
Ritter 1986). However, one of the differences between IPOs and ICOs is that investment banks do 
not participate in the issuance of crypto tokens in ICOs. The ICO price of a token is set by firm 
executives after considering the market demand after releasing its whitepaper.  
  A confident whitepaper or a whitepaper with a more positive tone is considered to be a sign 
of CEO/executive confidence. Previous studies have found that overconfident CEOs are prone to 
make aggressive decisions (Deshmukh et al.2013, Galasso and Simcoe 2011, Malmendier and Tate 
2005). Meanwhile, overconfidence can lead to overestimation of returns and underestimation of 
risks. In the case of ICOs, overconfident CEOs are likely to overestimate the market demand and 
are more optimistic about the future development of their companies. Thus, they may set a 
relatively higher ICO price, resulting in a smaller degree of underpricing or a greater degree of 
overpricing. This argument suggests a negative relationship between whitepaper confidence and 
ICO first-day returns.  
On the other hand, to investors, a whitepaper with a positive tone sends positive signals to 
investors and positively affect how they perceive a crypto token. The application of the affective 
heuristic in the financial markets (Finucane et al. 2000) confirms that the decisions of investors 
are based not only on rationality but also on their personal feelings in the context of investing. The 
subjective information contained in an introductory content associated with a financial asset is the 





whitepaper that is more confident may therefore raise the market demand of a token and, by 
extension, the market price of the token at its ICO.  
Besides, previous studies on managerial behavior (Bloomfield, 2002; Callen et al. 2013) 
have shown that managers tend to obfuscate information by using more complex disclosures when 
company is performing poorly. A possible motivation for this type of managerial behavior is to 
delay and reduce the incorporation of information that is not to the company’s advantage into 
equity prices. This behavior is also found with issuers of crypto tokens, as the blockchain startups 
have incentives to avoid disclosure related to the risk and uncertainty of their projects to raise as 
much as possible through their ICOs. An unreadable whitepaper is more likely to be seen as an 
attempt to hide or delay the future discovery of adverse information, and it would lead to lower 
demand at the token’s ICO. Eventually, an unreadable whitepaper would be associated with a 
higher return, as the low demand drives down the token price at its ICO. 
However, the crypto markets are largely unregulated, and the whitepapers are not audited. 
Corporate executives might use their whitepaper to mislead investors. If investors have any 
misgivings about the reliability of a whitepaper, a confident whitepaper may instead have a 
negative influence on the token price, so that the developed theories in the equity markets no longer 
apply to the ICOs. Due to the conflicting arguments, I only hypothesize here that the confidence, 
tone and readability of whitepapers are related to ICO underpricing. An equivalent hypothesis is 
that the coefficients of confidence, tone and readability are statistically different from zero.  
To more clearly determine effect of subjectivity in the whitepapers, I control for other 
factors that are important to a token’s returns. The effect of the cryptocurrency regulations of the 
country/region where the issuer of a crypto token is located is influential. For instance, if the 





country that is regulated under tax laws or anti-money laundering/anti-terrorism financing laws, 
then the tokens issued in this country are restricted under its legalities. This could possibly reduce 
the demand for crypto tokens in regulated countries. Besides, government efforts in investor 
protection matter when investors are risk-averse. Crypto tokens issued by companies in countries 
with a good reputation for investor protection would appear to be more attractive to investors. 
In addition, there is company-related technical or financing information other than the 
subjective information disclosed in the whitepapers that could impact the price changes during the 
first trading day. The issuers of the cryptocurrencies, mostly blockchain startups, primarily use 
social media platforms to communicate with potential clients and investors. The amount of 
objective information available on social media platforms could affect the decisions of investors 
and thus the ICO returns. 
Since whitepapers are a reference source for the issuer’s business and products, the issuer’s 
industry if the issuer serves as a proxy for the technical details released in its whitepaper and other 
marketing events. Additionally, studies of the equity markets found that the issuer’s industry 
affiliation of the issuer has a significance on the underpricing of the assets in the equity market 
(Akhigbe et al. 2003; Henrick 2012). Since ICOs share some common traits with IPOs, the industry 
of the issuer of a cryptocurrency could be relevant to the level of mispricing in ICOs. Furthermore, 
the registration country has a role as well, since cultural and linguistic differences may affect 
issuers’ writing in their whitepapers. 
Meanwhile, the volatility of the market one week before the first trading day of a crypto 
token could possibly affect the level of mispricing since the investors could make decisions based 
on the risk shown by overall cryptocurrency market in the past. Lastly, time of issuance has an 





As investors become more acquainted with the cryptocurrencies, the level of mispricing could 
change with time.  
Altogether, in this paper, I assume that a token’s ICO return is determined by subjective 
information in its whitepaper (relative to its level of confidence, tone, and readability), the 
regulatory environment of the issuer’s country, the amount of information available on social 




The first dependent variable of interest is the first-day excess ICO return (ExcessReturn) 
of a token. ExcessReturn is calculated as the difference between the closing price on the first 
trading day of a token and token ICO offer price, divided by the ICO offer price. Since there is a 
timespan between the completion of an ICO and the listing of the token, I adjust the first-day 
returns with the returns of the overall cryptocurrency market during this “waiting period”. The 
trend in the overall market is proxied with a cryptocurrency index, the Crypto Currency Index 30 
(CCI30). The team behind this index has taken 30 of the cryptocurrencies with the largest market 
capitalizations, weighted them by the square root of their market capitalizations, and generated an 
index that combines weights and their prices. In this paper, the return of the CCI30 index on the 












To take into account the fact that there are differences in the time elapsed between the end 
date of the ICO of a token and the listing of the token, I will run another set of regressions with a 
secondary dependent variable, daily excess return (DailyReturn). This dependent variable 
represents the daily returns that an investor would receive if they buy a token at the ICO end date 
and hold it until the first day of trading.  
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = [(1 + 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)
B
#DEFG	HIJK	LMN	OPQRSTIUPK	EKD	SUGIUKV	PW	IPXTKY ] − 1 
Note that, for the tokens in the sample of this paper, there is no evident time trend in the 
length of the time gap between token ICO completion and listing, see Figure 2. However, the 
sample may have selection bias towards tokens with a shorter timespan, because the tokens issued 
in 2018 with a longer waiting period are not listed at the time of the data collection, and thus they 
are not in this included in the sample. 
Figure 2: Number of days lapsed between end of ICO and token listing 
 
The explanatory variables are scores for subjectivity in the whitepapers. To carry out 
content analysis on the whitepapers, I adopt the method of computer-aided text analysis, in which 
a computer analyzes documents by counting the number of relevant words to capture a particular 





information: 1) confidence (Confidence), 2) emotional tone (Tone), and 3) readability (Fog). 
Confidence and emotional tone are linguistically analyzed by a language processing program 
called LIWC2015. The program matches words in the whitepapers with its lexicons for confidence 
and a positive tone. Then, the program produces quantitative scores measuring subjective 
information based on the number of words in the whitepapers matched with the words in the 
lexicons. More matching words will provide a higher score for a certain type of subjective 
information. 
The scores for confidence and tone range from 0 to 100. A high score for confidence5 
means that the author of a whitepaper is speaking from high expertise and is confident. A low 
score for confidence suggests a more modest style of writing. Similarly, a high score for emotional 
tone is associated with a more positive, upbeat style; a low number reveals greater levels of anxiety. 
In this paper, I use the Fog index 6  as a quantitative measure for the readability of 
whitepapers. The Fog index of readability of a file is defined as follows: 
Fog = 0.4(average		words	per	sentence + percentage	of	complex	words) 
where complex words are defined as words with three syllables or more. A higher Fog index means 
that the text is less readable. The relationship between the Fog and reading ease is as follows: 
FOG>18 means the text is unreadable; 14–18 means difficult; 12–14 means ideal; 10–12 means 
acceptable. The Fog index in this paper is calculated by R software, with the ‘KoRpus’ package. 
To control for the cryptocurrency regulatory environment of cryptocurrency in each 
country, I add two variables to the model. I create a dummy variable (AML)7 for the presence of 
                                               
5 See Appendix C for examples of paragraphs from whitepapers with extreme confidence scores. 
6 The Fog index was first developed by Robert Gunning in 1952 to determine whether that text can be read easily by 
the intended audience. The index has become widely-used in academic studies in this field after Li (2008) used it to 
measure readability in his paper. 
7 Countries/regions that have implemented anti-money laundering laws (according to the Library of Congress): 
Australia, Canada, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Isle of 





anti-money laundering laws in the issuer’s country/region of the issuer to control for the effect of 
country-specific regulatory factors. The dummy variable for anti-money laundering laws equals 1 
if the laws are part of the regulatory framework of residence country of the cryptocurrency issuer 
and 0 otherwise. The regulatory details regarding crypto anti-money laundering in each country 
are collected from the Global Law Research Center of the U.S. Law Library of Congress. I also 
include the World Bank’s strength of investor protection index (SIP) from the World Bank to 
control for the amount efforts put forth by governments in protecting the interest of investors. 
For the information released on social media platforms, I use the social media scores from 
icobench.com, an ICO information aggregator, to quantify the amount of marketing done by an 
issuer on social media platforms. This is based on the account activity on eight major platforms, 
including Twitter, GitHub, and Telegram. The score ranges from 0 to 100.  
Additionally, the volatility of the overall market is measured as the standard deviation of 
the CCI30 index during the week before a token’s the first trading day. The time of issuance is 
calculated as the number days between the first day of 2018 and the ICO completion date. 
The proposed control variables are industry, country, anti-money laundering laws binary 
variable (AML), strength of investor protection index ranged from 0 to 100 (SIP), social media 
activity score ranged from 0 to 100 (SocialMedia), the beta coefficient (beta), the volatility of the 
overall cryptocurrency market over the week before the token’s first trading day (Volatility), and 
a time variable (t).  
I develop two regression models based on the variables defined above: 
ExcessReturni = 
α + β1Confidence + β2Tone + β3Fog + β4AML + β5SIP + 









α + β1Confidence + β2Tone + β3Fog + β4AML + β5SIP + 
β6SocialMedia + β7Volatility + Industry FE + Country FE + β8 
t+ϵi 
(2) 
To address the potential correlations between the variables of tokens in the same country, 
I run models (1) and (2) with standard errors clustered by country.  
 
6.Data and Summary Statistics 
I collected information on historical ICOs from coindesk.com, icobench.com, and 
icodrops.com. Using multiple data sources enables me to combine the ICOs covered by each 
website. The sample in this paper involves all tokens with the end date of their ICO prior to October 
31, 2018 and listed before December 31, 2018. There are 258 tokens in the sample. For each token, 
I collected the secondary market post-ICO trading data from coinmarketcap.com, a data provider 
with the most comprehensive secondary market data on traded crypto tokens. The data for 
confidence and tone in the whitepapers are generated by LIWC2015. The Fog index is calculated 
by R software. Tables 2 and 3 provide the summary statistics and a correlation matrix for the 
variables.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Unit N Mean SD Min Max 
              
ExcessReturn  % 258 32.688 122.47 -79.326 411.294 
DailyReturn  % 258 2.13 10.711 -8.999 39.28 
Confidence  Index ranges from 0 to 100 258 60.06 7.472 26.87 78.17 
Tone Index ranges from 0 to 100 258 66.47 15.39 25.4 97.96 
Fog Index ranges from 0 to infinity 258 14.03 2.417 8.5 26.4 
AML Binary 258 0.426 0.496 0 1 
SIP Index ranges from 0 to 100 258 71.32 19.52 23 95 
Volatility Index ranges from 0 to infinity 258 485.3 448.2 22.63 2410 
Socialmedia Index ranges from 0 to 100 258 61.45 18.06 19 100 
t days 258 97.59 72.94 0 295 






Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. ExcessReturn 1.000          
2. DailyReurn 0.645 1.000         
3. Confidence -0.150 -0.119 1.000        
4. Tone -0.063 0.015 0.425 1.000       
5. Fog 0.047 0.050 -0.019 0.001 1.000      
6. AML 0.017 0.018 0.057 0.026 0.058 1.000     
7. SIP 0.049 0.032 -0.098 -0.066 0.083 0.195 1.000    
8. Volatility -0.007 -0.001 -0.079 -0.042 -0.055 0.023 -0.067 1.000   
9. SocialMedia 0.371 0.449 -0.025 0.014 0.037 -0.085 -0.017 0.050 1.000  
10. t -0.202 -0.204 -0.120 -0.119 -0.070 0.076 -0.011 -0.057 -0.607 1.000 
 
The mean of ExcessReturn and DailyReturn is 32.688% and 2.13%, respectively, which 
are positive and significant in magnitude. The expected return of a token in this sample is positive 
over the period between ICO completion and the listing of the token. Thus, the tokens are more 
likely to be underpriced than overpriced at their ICOs. 
 
7.Empirical Results 
Excess ICO Return 
Model (3) in Table 4 reports the regression coefficients when the dependent variable is 
ExcessReturn. The coefficient of the confidence level is significant. The negative sign implies that 
a whitepaper with more confidence is associated with ICOs that deliver a lower return, and thus 
less of underpricing. The result is economically meaningful as well. If the confidence score 
increases by one standard deviation (7.5 points), keeping all other variables constant, the excess 








Table 4: Determinants of ExcessReturn and DailyReturn 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ExcessReturn DailyReturn ExcessReturn DailyReturn 
          
Confidence -2.448** -0.218** -2.012* -0.178* 
 (1.122) (0.0983) (1.144) (0.0999) 
Tone 0.00302 0.0550 -0.392 0.0479 
 (0.545) (0.0477) (0.580) (0.0829) 
Fog 2.240 0.209 3.264 0.201 
 (3.140) (0.275) (3.271) (0.231) 
SIP   -1.045 -0.0681* 
   (1.654) (0.0376) 
AML   111.9* 0.613 
   (63.33) (1.821) 
SocialMedia   0.0138 0.0126 
   (0.448) (0.0469) 
Volatility   0.0932*** 0.0120*** 
   (0.0219) (0.00298) 
t   0.0466 0.0153 
   (0.135) (0.0178) 
Constant 148.1* 8.615 24.18 4.962 
 (76.65) (6.713) (199.0) (11.98) 
     
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Clustered by Country No No Yes Yes 
Observations 258 258 258 258 
R-squared 0.024 0.022 0.319 0.325 
Results of relationship between ICO mispricing and whitepaper confidence 
provided. All variables are defined in Panel 1 of Appendix A. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant level of 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. 
 
Daily Excess Return 
 Model (4) in Table 4 reports the regression results by using the daily excess return 
as the dependent variable. The confidence level of the whitepaper is negatively associated with the 
daily excess return, which is consistent with the results from the regression where the dependent 
variable is the excess return. The findings from this model imply that if the language in a token’s 





confidence score of a whitepaper increase by one standard deviation (7.5 points), keeping all else 
constant, the daily excess return between ICO completion and listing is expected to decrease by 
1.335 (7.5*0.178) percentage points.  
Since the confidence is negatively associated with ICO returns, it would appear that 
investors are sensitive to the confidence in the whitepapers. Confidence in a token’s whitepaper 
could drive up the demand for the token. Meanwhile, issuers with more confident whitepapers are 
inclined to be more optimistic about future operations. As a result of higher token demand and 
issuer optimism, the ICO of tokens with more confident whitepapers may issue at a higher price, 
and thus the token is less underpriced at their ICOs. The results here are consistent with the 
established theories on the relationship between confidence shown in IPO filings and IPO returns. 
Additionally, in regression (3) of Table 4, the coefficient of anti-money laundering laws 
(AML) is significantly positive. The sign of the coefficient of AML possibly suggests that for 
countries that have enforced anti-money laundering laws on the crypto markets, the ICO returns 
of issuers in those countries tend to be more positive/less negative. The massive use of 
cryptocurrency to transfer illegal funds may explain for the sign of the coefficient of the AML. 
Currently, professionals are providing non-trackable transaction services in the market, and it is 
estimated that around $761 million USD was laundered via all kinds of cryptocurrency in the first 
half of 2018 (Crosman, 2018). Tokens that are issued in countries where money-laundering 
activities are monitored could be considered less attractive as they cannot be used for wealth 
transfer purposes. Another possible explanation for the positive sign of the AML coefficient is that 
the issuers located in countries with AML are more conservative when setting the ICO prices. The 
returns for tokens with AML=0 are therefore higher because the tokens tend to be more underpriced 





Meanwhile, in models (1) and (2), the coefficients of market volatility are significantly 
positive, thus indicating that when the market volatility is high before the first trading day, the ICO 
return of the token is likely to be high as well. When the market is more volatile, the return of the 
tokens being listed is higher to compensate for the risk embedded. 
 
Additional test: Effects of AML 
 Since the presence of crypto anti-money laundering laws in a country restricts the tokens 
issued by firms in this country to legal uses, the demand for tokens issued in a country with crypto 
anti-money laundering laws could be lower at their ICOs. In comparison, another token issued in 
a country where crypto anti-money laundering laws are implemented, another token with the same 
level of confidence but issued in a country where crypto money laundering are unregulated could 
be more overpriced/less underpriced due to the higher demand for tokens with no money-
laundering restrictions. Due to the potential effect of the AML, the relationship between the 
dependent variables may differ for tokens with issuers in countries with AML and those in countries 
without AML. 
To further test the effect of AML, I divide the sample into two parts: a subsample of tokens 
from countries where AML is enforced cryptocurrency markets, and another subsample of tokens 
with issuers in countries where there are no crypto money laundering regulations. I interact every 
independent and control variable with the binary variable AML.  
ExcessReturn = α + β1Confidence + β2Tone + β3Fog + β4AML + β5SIP + 
β6SocialMedia + β7Volatility + β8 t + β9AML*Confidence + 
β10AML*Tone + β11AML*Fog + β12AML*SIP + 








α + β1Confidence + β2Tone + β3Fog + β4AML + β5SIP + 
β6SocialMedia + β7Volatility + β8 t + β9AML*Confidence + 
β10AML*Tone + β11AML*Fog + β12AML*SIP + 
β13AML*SocialMedia + β14AML*Volatility + β15AML*t + Industry 
FE +ϵ 
(4) 
I include interactions between AML and the control variables as well because I assume that 
the coefficient of the control variable should be different for tokens with different values of AML. 
If using a model that only interacts AML with the independent variables, then it is implicitly 
assumed that the tokens should share the same coefficients on the control variables regardless of 
the presence of AML. The p-value of difference shown in Table 5 is the p-value corresponding to 
the independent variable’s interaction with AML.  
In column (1) of Table 5, when the dependent variable is the excess return of the ICO, the 
coefficient on confidence for tokens with issuers in countries where crypto money laundering is 
unregulated is -3.546 (significant at 5%), while the coefficient on confidence for tokens that are 
regulated under AML is 0.121 (insignificant) in column (2). If we run the regression interacting 
explanatory variables with AML, the interaction between confidence and AML has a p-value of 
0.119, which is marginally significant, this implying that it could be possible to prove the 
difference if I had a larger sample size. Columns (3) and (4) show a similar pattern when the 
dependent variable is the daily excess return. While for the AML=0 group, confidence has a 
negatively significant coefficient of -0.275, the p-value of the difference between the coefficients 
on confidence when AML=1 and when AML=0 is 0.047, which is significant at 5% as well. The 
results here indicate that the effect of confidence on first-day ICO returns is different across 
countries. The negative relationship between confidence and the dependent variables is driven by 
tokens with issuers in countries where there are no AML on crypto tokens. Only when the token is 





Table 5: AML subsample analysis  
  (1) (2) p-value of  (3) (4) p-value of  
VARIABLES ExcessReturn ExcessReturn Difference DailyReturn DailyReturn Difference 
 AML=0 AML=1 
 AML=0 AML=1  
             
Confidence -3.546** 0.121 0.119 -0.275*** -0.00975 0.047** 
 (1.387) (1.883)  (0.0644) (0.137)  
Tone -0.0863 -0.435 0.758 0.0270 0.0668 0.729 
 (0.700) (0.901)  (0.0996) (0.0888)  
Fog 6.647 -3.497 0.114 0.286 0.163 0.780 
 (4.234) (4.725)  (0.245) (0.493)  
SIP 0.205 0.418 0.789 0.0183 0.0139 0.937 
 (0.588) (0.529)  (0.0431) (0.0372)  
SocialMedia -0.227 0.0235 0.765 -0.0327 0.0467 0.444 
 (0.557) (0.637)  (0.0323) (0.0864)  
Volatility 0.0983*** 0.120*** 0.633 0.0123*** 0.0129*** 0.892 
 (0.0259) (0.0365)  (0.00365) (0.00406)  
t 0.140 -0.0125 0.566 0.0211 0.00923 0.56 
 (0.172) (0.204)  (0.0138) (0.0133)  
Constant 36.88 -28.40 0.74 7.570 -11.28 0.125 
 (136.5) (153.2)  (7.502) (13.60)  
       
Interactions Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Clustered by 
Country Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Observations 258 258  258 258  
R-squared 0.272 0.272   0.298 0.298   
Results of relationship between ICO mispricing and whitepaper confidence provided. All variables are 
defined in Panel 1 of Appendix A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 




 Previous studies have shown that market sentiment influences stock returns. (Liew and 
Wang 2015, Ljungqvist et al. 2006) However, the models used in their regressions do not fully 
address the issue that the crypto token markets are not efficient, and the price of crypto tokens is 
largely affected by market sentiment. The Crypto Fear & Greed Index (CFGI), produced by 





analyzes the market sentiment based on market volatility, market size, social media sentiment, 
major coin dominance, major coin price trends, and surveys. The CFGI ranges from 0 to 100, 
where 0 stands for “extreme fear” and 100 represents “extreme greed”. Adding the CFGI of the 
first trading day of a token as a variable to the models may reduce the measurement error in the 
previous regression models.  
The results in regressions (1) and (2) of Table 8 illustrate that the relationship between 
confidence and the dependent variables remains unchanged after including market sentiment into 
the models.  
 
Beta Coefficient 
To consider token-specific risks, I calculate the beta coefficient which measures a token’s 




In calculating the covariance and variance of the returns, I use the daily returns of each token and 
the CCI30 index during the first two weeks after the token’s listing. An assumption is that the beta 
coefficient is constant before and after the listing of the token, so that the beta calculated from 
price changes in secondary markets is an estimate for token-specific risk before the token’s listing.  
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 8, the coefficients of confidence remain negatively 









Table 8: Determinants of ExcessReturn and DailyReturn, controlling for CFGI8or beta9 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ExcessReturn DailyReturn ExcessReturn DailyReturn 
          
Confidence -2.667* -0.206** -2.067* -0.168** 
 (1.349) (0.0845) (1.162) (0.0690) 
Tone -0.400 -0.0139 -0.386 0.0478 
 (0.418) (0.0424) (0.584) (0.0790) 
Fog 6.465* 0.421* 3.102 0.227 
 (3.684) (0.251) (3.316) (0.299) 
AML 112.4 0.463 138.5* 0.570 
 (92.91) (4.346) (73.20) (1.664) 
SIP -1.044 -0.0403 -1.130 -0.0787 
 (0.977) (0.114) (1.668) (0.0643) 
SocialMedia -0.0541 0.0379 0.0290 0.0116 
 (0.528) (0.0333) (0.451) (0.0359) 
Volatility 0.0584 0.00394 0.0927*** 0.0119*** 
 (0.0503) (0.00241) (0.0221) (0.00338) 
t 0.105 0.0176* 0.0360 0.0142 
 (0.267) (0.0106) (0.136) (0.00991) 
CFGI 0.381 0.0977**   
 (0.507) (0.0415)   
beta   3.166 0.875 
   (7.842) (0.666) 
Constant 29.79 4.603 10.43 4.218 
 (202.6) (14.35) (201.0) (17.03) 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by Country Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 233 233 256 256 
R-squared 0.267 0.221 0.320 0.329 
Results of relationship between ICO mispricing and whitepaper confidence 
provided. All variables are defined in Panel 1 of Appendix A. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant level of 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
                                               
8 The number of observations is smaller for regressions (1) and (2) in Table 8 because the historical data of CFGI 
starts from February 2018. The tokens that were listed in January 2018 are subsequently deleted from the regression. 
9 The number of observations is smaller for regressions in Table 9 because some of the tokens were just listed at the 






ICOs are an emerging form of financing that raises funds by issuing crypto tokens. This 
study investigates the relationship between the level of ICO mispricing and three kinds of 
subjective information in token whitepapers: confidence, emotional tone, and readability. Using a 
sample containing 258 listed tokens with ICOs that ended between January 2018 and October 2018, 
I find that more ex-ante confidence shown in token whitepapers produces lower ICO returns. The 
results are robust after adding additional controlling variables, beta coefficients and market 
sentiment proxied by the CFGI.  
Although the regressions here provide evidence of a relationship between confidence 
shown in whitepapers and ICO mispricing, we should interpret the findings in the light of study 
limitations. The study focuses on a sample in which token ICOs ended between January 2018 and 
October 2018. As the cryptocurrency markets are very volatile, the results of this study may not 
hold for ICOs in other time periods. Additionally, this study only considers three types of 
subjective information in whitepapers. It is recommended that future research examine the effects 
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Panel 1: Description of Variables 
Variable   Description and Calculation Methodology     
ExcessReturn   Market-adjusted return of ICO       
    Return of a crypto token from end date of ICO to first trading day of token 
    - the return of CCI30 index from the end date of ICO to listing of token 
DailyReturn Market-adjusted return of ICO compounded on a daily basis   
    (1+ICOReturn)^(1/# days between ICO end date and listing of token) -1   
                
Confidence   The scores produced by LIWC2015 that measure the confidence level of  
    whitepapers           
Tone   The scores produced by LIWC2015 that measure the positiveness of  
    whitepapers           
Fog   A readability index      
    Fog=0.4(average words per sentence + percentage of complex words)   
AML   A dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuer's country has applied anti-money 
    laws to cryptocurrencies         
SIP   
The index of the strength of investor protection developed by the World 
Bank   
                
SocialMedia 
Scores that measure issuer's marketing activity on social media obtained 
from icobench.com   
             
Volatility   The standard deviation of the CCI30 index 7 days prior to the 
    first trading day of token, calculated by the author       
t   The number of days from the first day of 2018 to ICO completion day 








Panel 2: Frequency of ICOs, by industry 
Industry Freq. Percent Cum. 
Advertising 8 3.07 3.07 
Blockchain Infrastructure 63 24.14 27.21 
Collaboration & Sharing 4 1.53 28.74 
Data Services 9 3.45 32.19 
Education 3 1.15 33.34 
Energy & Utilities 9 3.45 36.78 
Entertainment 3 1.15 37.93 
Exchange 6 2.3 40.24 
Finance 43 16.48 56.72 
Gambling 2 0.77 57.49 
Gaming & VR 11 4.21 61.7 
Healthcare 7 2.68 64.38 
Machine Learning & AI 7 2.68 67.06 
Marketplace 16 6.13 73.19 
Mobile Platform 5 1.92 75.11 
Other Industries 14 5.36 80.47 
Payments 4 1.53 81.99 
Privacy & Security 7 2.68 84.67 
Real Estate 4 1.53 86.21 
Social Network 4 1.53 87.74 
Trading 22 8.43 96.17 
Verification 10 3.83 100 








Panel 3: Frequency of ICOs, by country/region 
 
Countries  Freq. Percent Cum. 
Australia 2 0.77 0.77 
Canada 3 1.15 1.92 
Cayman Islands 7 2.68 4.6 
China 12 4.6 9.2 
Cyprus 2 0.77 9.97 
Estonia 8 3.07 13.04 
France 6 2.3 15.34 
Germany 6 2.3 17.64 
Gibraltar 10 3.83 21.47 
Hong Kong 4 1.53 23 
Indonesia 2 0.77 23.77 
Liechtenstein 2 0.77 24.54 
Lithuania 3 1.15 25.69 
Malta 3 1.15 26.84 
Multiple 7 2.68 29.52 
Netherlands 3 1.15 30.67 
Other Countries 18 6.89 37.56 
The Philippines 3 1.15 38.71 
Russia 5 1.92 40.63 
Seychelles 2 0.77 41.4 
Singapore 48 18.39 59.79 
Slovenia 5 1.92 61.71 
South Africa 2 0.77 62.48 
Switzerland 22 8.43 70.91 
UAE 2 0.77 71.68 
UK 27 9.96 81.64 
USA 47 18.01 100 















































































Appendix C: Examples of paragraphs from the introduction section of whitepapers with extreme 
high or low confidence scores 
 
Experty (EXY), confidence score: 78.17 
 
We see an opportunity to connect our dedicated software with blockchain technology. Our goal 
is to make Experty fully decentralized, thus preventing DDoS attacks from taking the platform 
down entirely. Experty will have the ability to operate globally, without interruption, at any time 
of day. Instead of building a single consultation marketplace, we have created a protocol 
allowing users to share their paid call links or QR codes whenever they want, including but not 
limited to: websites, blogs, and social network profiles or portals. 
 
Hade (HADE), confidence score: 78.25 
 
The HADE Platform is the world’s first database built around the inclusion of company-specific 
information. HADE leverages what we believe is the world’s most valuable database with 
cutting edge data visualization, data analytics, machine learning, artificial intelligence, and now 
blockchain technology. We believe that blockchain technology will become a crucial component 
of our platform for reasons that relate to security, identification, transparency, and product 
development. We aim to become the world’s largest network for investment research by utilizing 
blockchain technology with machine learning, data visualization, data analysis, and artificial 
intelligence with plans to disrupt a $50 billion industry. 
 
Bluzelle (BLZ), confidence score: 37.85 
 
Just like decentralized services like Filecoin and Storj are needed for file storage & management; 
there is a need for data storage & management. Bluzelle is a decentralized database used by 
soRware developers to achieve unprecedented security and scale. Bluzelle fills a need and is 
complementary to the other components to make the decentralized Internet complete. Without 
these decentralized components, the decentralized Internet would not be able to run efficiently 
and scale to massive use.  
	
NeuroChain (NCC), confidence score: 39.35 
 
NeuroChain (the “Company”) is the best answer available since it is a brand new protocol based 
on a new consensus that does not give the priority to the biggest computation capacity or the 
wealthiest approvers, but rather the best behaviors (entropy, enthalpy and integrity, see below, or 
in our blog for scientific whitepaper for further technical descriptions).With NeuroChain 
intelligent bots can evolve thanks to machine learning and benefit from the collective 
improvement made by other providers in the system. This new protocol, an open source 
language, can be deployed safely and benefit from the collective intelligence created by the 
network of contributors. 
 
 
 
 
 
